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Removing obstacles to equal recognition for persons with intellectual disability: Taking 
exception to the way things are  
Supprimer les obstacles à la reconnaissance égale pour les personnes ayant un handicap 
mental: n’être pas d’accord avec le statu quo  
Abstract  
 
Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities challenges the 
misconception that persons with intellectual disability, among others, are not capable to 
take decisions for them- selves. This paper first considers the right to equal recognition 
before the law within the light of the General Comment on Article 12 issued by the 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which emphasises the need to move 
away completely from substitute decision-making and to promote supported decision- 
making. The importance of Article 12 within the context of the Convention as a whole is also 
considered, together with the limited extent to which supported decision-making has been 
implemented. The paper argues that, with the exception of some jurisdictions, substitute 
decision-making is still seen as the best way to respond to the support needs of people with 
intellectual disability. While there are plenty of examples of supported decision-making 
practices being used in the daily lives of people with intellectual disability, these remain the 
exception. Crucially, decisions made in this way are not legally valid. What is needed 
therefore is a recognition that different people can take decisions using different methods, 
with or without support, and for these methods to become legally recognised.  
Résumé  
L’article 12 de la Convention relative aux droits des personnes handicapées conteste l’idée 
fausse selon laquelle les personnes ayant un handicap mental, entre autres, ne sont pas 
capables de prendre des décisions pour elles-mêmes. Tout d’abord, cet article propose 
d’étudier le droit à une reconnaissance juridique égale dans le cadre de l’Observation 
générale sur l’article 12 publiée par le Comité des Droits des Personnes Handicapées. Celui-ci 
souligne la nécessité de renoncer aux dispositifs de décisions substitutives et de promouvoir 
des dispositifs d’aide à la décision. L’importance de l’article 12 dans le contexte de la 
Convention dans son ensemble est également analysée au regard de la mise en œuvre 
limitée des mesures d’aide à la décision. L’article montre que, à l’exception de certaines 
juridictions, la prise de décisions substitutives est toujours considérée comme la meilleure 
fac ̧on de répondre aux besoins de soutien des personnes ayant un handicap mental. Bien 
qu’il existe de nombreux exemples montrant que des pratiques d’aide à la décision sont 
utilisées dans la vie quotidienne des personnes ayant un handicap mental, ces pratiques 
restent l’exception. Fondamentalement, les décisions prises de cette manière ne sont pas 
juridiquement valables. Il apparaît donc néces- saire de reconnaître que différentes 
personnes peuvent prendre des décisions en utilisant différentes méthodes, avec ou sans 
soutien, de telle sorte que celles-ci deviennent légalement reconnues.  
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1. Introduction  
The difference between Idiots and mad Men [is] that mad Men put wrong Ideas 
together, and so make wrong Propositions, but argue and reason right from 
them: but Idiots make very few or no Propositions, but argue and reason scare 
at all. (John Locke)  
This 17th century quotation from John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding may 
seem quaint, at best, to our 21st century minds. However, while the use of terms like ‘idiots’ 
and ‘mad Men’ in philosophical arguments and the practice of capitalising common nouns in 
English are things of the past, the idea expressed by Locke, especially in relation to ‘Idiots’ 
scarcely being able to argue and reason at all, is still very much alive in the present.  
This idea stands in sharp contrast to the proposition found in Article 12 of the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) (United Nations, 2006) that ‘all persons 
with disabilities have equal recognition before the law’. The CRPD does not make any 
distinction between one person with disability and another and therefore assumes that this 
right belongs to all disabled people, regardless of the nature and severity of their 
impairment. However, the universal applicability of this right has not been met with 
universal acceptance, and even less with universal application. In fact, the right of people 
with intellectual disability to be recognised as equal persons before the law is the subject of 
many debates, including in much of the literature cited in this paper. The discussion often 
centres on whether or not people with intellectual disability can exercise their legal 
capacity, thus being given equal recognition before the law. The fact that this debate exists, 
and seems to be still going strong a decade after the CRPD came into effect, shows how far 
people with intellectual disability are from being able to enjoy this right.  
2. The focus of this article  
The issue of equal recognition before the law affects most directly those who are at risk of 
having their legal capacity denied, including people with intellectual disability, people with 
mental health issues, as well as those with profound and multiple disabilities, people with 
severe brain injury or with advanced dementia, and people in a permanent vegetative state 
or in a coma. While there are issues that are of common concern for these persons, there 
are also many divergences. Some divergences are brought about simply by virtue of the fact 
that no one human being is like any other – the same disability will affect different people in 
different ways, both physiologically and because of the different social and personal 
situations that each person lives in. However, there are also issues that have particular 
resonance for people with similar conditions or types of impairment. This paper focuses on 
the issues that are of most concern for people with intellectual disability, while attending to 
the fact that different individuals with intellectual disability have different concerns.  
Both supported and substitute decision-making can take many forms. The latter includes 
inter- diction, incapacitation, plenary or partial guardianship, or any other form of ‘court-
authorised power to take decisions on behalf of the person’ (Fundamental Rights Agency, 
2013, p. 9). The former refers to practices where a support person enables a disabled 
person to take decisions through explaining relevant issues or, if necessary, interpreting the 
preferences of the individual ‘to exercise their legal capacity to the greatest extent possible, 
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by explaining issues and, where necessary, interpreting the preferences of the individual’ (p. 
9). For the sake of clarity, the terms supported decision-making and substitute decision-
making will be used throughout this paper to refer to these two types of practices.  
3. The right to recognition  
As Dinerstein (2012: 8) comments, the CRPD uses ‘deceptively simple’ language to assert 
the right to legal capacity of all disabled persons. Article 12 states that:  
• states parties reaffirm that persons with disabilities have the right to recognition 
everywhere as persons before the law;  
• states parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an 
equal basis with others in all aspects of life.  
In their General Comment about Article 12, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (2014a) (henceforth referred to as the Committee) affirm equal recognition as a 
basic right for disabled people, one that is based on the principles of autonomy, 
independence, and full and effective participation in the community, as set out in Article 3 
of the CRPD. The General Comment pulls no punches in asserting the inalienability of the 
right of disabled persons to exercise their legal capacity in all circumstances and with no 
exceptions.  
The CRPD recognizes that not all disabled people can exercise their legal capacity 
unsupported in all circumstances. In fact, Article 12.3 obliges States Parties to ‘take 
appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may 
require in exercising their legal capacity’. And as the General Comment makes it amply 
clear:  
All forms of support in the exercise of legal capacity, including more intensive 
forms of support, must be based on the will and preference of the person, not on 
what is perceived as being in his or her objective best interests (Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2014b, p. 7).  
In the General Comment, the Committee also calls unreservedly for the abolition of 
substitute decision-making legislation and practices and for the institution of supported 
decision-making laws and mechanisms in their stead. However, the Committee notes that 
not much progress has been made by most States Parties in adopting supported decision-
making legislation, in line with the requirements of Article 12.  
The reason for this lack of progress can be interpreted in one of two ways. It can be argued 
that Article 12’s right to recognition for all disabled persons is unrealistic. The Committee’s 
position can thus be seen as setting States Parties up to fall short of what will always remain 
an unattainable ideal. On the other hand, it can be argued that it is misconceptions about 
the abilities of people with intellectual disability and about the nature of autonomy and of 
decision-making processes that lead to failure in people with intellectual disability being 
recognised as persons before the law. At this stage, I feel I should declare myself as agreeing 
with this second argument. That said, I also feel it is important to understand why legal 
capacity is not seen as being achievable for all, if one is to find ways of making Article 12 a 
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reality for all disabled persons. The reasons why making this reality happen is important are 
set out in the next section.  
4. Article12 in the wider context of the CRPD  
Recognition as persons before the law is fundamental for enabling all disabled persons to 
enjoy all the rights enshrined in the CRPD. In fact, the General Comment observes that 
‘[l]egal capacity is indispensable for the exercise of civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights’ (p. 9). Therefore, disabled people are denied the specific rights embodied in 
the CRPD itself if they do not enjoy equal recognition before the law. The General Comment 
also links Article 12 directly with the General Prin- ciples of the CRPD set out in Article 3(a) 
‘Respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to make one’s own 
choices, and independence of persons’.  
Furthermore, as Mannan, MacLachlan, McVeigh, and the EquitAble Consortium (2012) point 
out, the first nine Articles of the CRPD, which set out the concepts and principles of the 
Convention are the basis for the interpretation of the other articles, including of course 
Article 12. The fundamental principle underlying these articles is that for disabled people to 
enjoy their rights, to be able to fully participate in an inclusive society, and to enjoy equal 
opportunities, accessibility and non-discrimination, they need to have their autonomy 
respected.  
Having this respect means that they are free to make their own choices, and act 
independently. Significantly, Article 3(a) links individual autonomy with the inherent dignity 
of disabled persons. Even more significantly, the purpose of the whole Convention is ‘to 
promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their 
inherent dignity’ (Article 1), in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United 
Nations, 1948) which starts by recognizing that inherent dignity and human rights are ‘the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’ (p. 1).  
As Mladenov (2013) states, the CRPD presents a “new understanding of disabled people’s 
way of being [which]. . . is clearly informed by an emphasis on ‘individual autonomy”’ (p. 
73). This under- standing is evident in several articles throughout the CRPD. Mannan et al. 
(2012) note that one of the core concepts in the Convention is that of individualised 
services. As Article 19 states, disabled people’s right to live independently and be included 
in the community comprises their right ‘to choose their place of residence and where and 
with whom they live on an equal basis with others and are not obliged to live in a particular 
living arrangement’ (Article 19a). Likewise, the follow- ing article does not simply state that 
disabled people have a right to personal mobility but that they have a right to the 
facilitation of their mobility ‘in the manner and at the time of their choice’ [Article 20 (a)].  
Furthermore, one finds Article 14 (Liberty and security of the person), Article 21 (Freedom 
of expression and opinion, and access to information), and Article 22 (Respect for privacy) – 
three articles which further bolster disabled people’s right to self-determination and 
autonomy. This right they can exercise in their private lives, as seen above, and also in 
public life especially as asserted in Article 29 (Partici- pation in political and public life) and 
Article 30 (Participation in cultural life, recreation, leisure and sport). Arstein-Kerslake and 
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Flynn (2016) also link Article 12 with the right not to be discriminated against (set out in 
Article 5), the right to marry and to found a family (Article 23), protecting the per- son’s 
integrity (Article 17) and health-related rights (Article 25). Finally, it is important to note that 
the CRPD also gives disabled people the right to have a say about the implementation and 
monitoring of the CRPD itself, especially through the obligations it places on States Parties in 
Articles 4.3 (General obligations) and 33.3 (National implementation and monitoring).  
The equal recognition before the law of all disabled people, as asserted in Article 12, can 
thus be seen as the bedrock of the realisation, at an individual and societal level, of the 
rights set out in the CRPD. Without equal recognition of legal capacity, a disabled person 
cannot enjoy these rights fully since they are denied their capacity to act (European 
Foundation Centre, 2010). And without that capacity, they cannot take for themselves 
decisions that impact their lives, for example regarding health, work, education, intimate 
relationships and their place of residence (Glen, 2013; United Nations, 2007).  
5. Progressive realisation of equal recognition  
The rights that are affirmed in the CRPD are not an end in themselves but a means to an end 
– that of enabling disabled people to participate fully in society, on an equal basis with 
others, on their own terms. Thus, the realization of the rights set out in the CRPD can be 
seen as a process. In fact, the Convention allows for the progressive realisation of economic, 
social and cultural rights [Article 4 (2) General Obligations], but not for fundamental rights. 
Furthermore, in the General Comment the Committee asserts that:  
“Progressive realization” (art. 4, para. 2) does not apply to the provisions of 
Article 12. Upon ratifying the Convention, States parties must immediately begin 
taking steps towards the realization of the rights provided for in Article 12. (para 
30, pp. 7–8)  
However, it seems that States Parties are only progressively realising what Article 12 entails, 
and only a few of them are doing that (European Foundation Centre, 2010). Canada 
(especially British Columbia) is taken by many as a leader in the enactment of supported 
decision-making legislation (Devi, 2013). As reported by Boundy and Fleischner (2013), 
other countries that have adopted such legislation include Sweden, Australia, Germany, 
Scotland, England and Ireland. In other countries, such as Mexico, ‘decision making for 
people with intellectual disabilities is an emerging topic of discussion’ [Inclusion 
International (2014), p. 10]. There is no one single model of supported decision-making.1 
Lewis (2011) observes that “[t]he term ‘supported decision-making’ has come to mean that 
 
1 For examples of different models of supported decision-making legislation and structures see, among others: 
Blanck and Martinis (2015); European Foundation Centre (2010); Fundamental Rights Agency (2013); Glen 
(2015). In their submissions to the Draft General Comment on Article 12, ACT Disability, Aged and Carer 
Advocacy Service suggest the use of what they term ‘subjective decision-making’ which is made on behalf of 
persons in specific circumstances using a will and preferences rather than a best interest approach. The 
Australian Human Rights Commission suggests a similar approach which they term ‘facilitated decision-
making’. These two submissions are available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/ 
DGCArticles12And9.aspx.  
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which substituted decision-making is not” (p. 704). And, as the same author says further, if 
the latter ‘amounts to civil death, implementation of art. 12 of the CRPD enables civil life’ 
(Lewis, 2011, p. 705).  
Civil death is unfortunately still a reality or a potential reality for many people with 
intellectual disability. There is therefore a pronounced misalignment between the 
inalienability of the right of universal recognition set out in Article 12 and the General 
Comment on the one hand, and the lived reality of many people with intellectual disability 
on the other. In its submission to the Draft Comment, the Australian Human Rights 
Commission (2014) ‘recommends that the Committee include consider- ation of the nature 
of immediate obligations and the doctrine of progressive realisation, particularly where a 
State Party is genuinely not able to provide the full supports that are required.’ (p. 8, bold in 
the original). Indeed, as seen in the quotation from the General Comment above, what the 
Committee itself demands is for States parties ‘to begin taking steps towards the realization’ 
of Article 12. But it seems that, with some exceptions, not even these steps are being taken. 
The current state of affairs is explored further in the next section.  
6. States Parties’ im(position) on Article 12 
Significantly, even those countries, which have supported decision-making legislation in 
place have retained the possibility of using substitute decision-making for disabled people, 
imposing their own positions on the matter. In fact, Article 12 is being more often honoured 
in the breach than in the observance. This situation comes out clearly in the interpretations 
and reservations made by various governments upon ratification of the CRPD. Taking into 
account what is stated in these documents is important because, as Mladenov (2013) points 
out, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that the interpretation of the text 
of treaties should take into consideration related official documentation as well as debates 
prior to the adoption of the treaty.  
In fact, Article 12 was hotly debated even while the text of the CRPD was being negotiated, 
prior to its adoption in 2006 by the United Nations General Assembly. Several authors attest 
to the controversy surrounding the insistence of disabled people’s organisations that equal 
recognition before the law should be given to all disabled people. Dinerstein (2012) states 
that it was Article 12 that gave rise to most debate and most controversy during 
negotiations, with Lewis (2011) describing legal capacity as having been ‘fiercely negotiated 
by the Ad Hoc Committee’ set up by the United Nations to draw up the text of the CRPD (p. 
703). For Inclusion International, one of the non-governmental organisations who fought 
hard not to include a direct reference to substitute decision-making in Article 12, this was 
one of the most difficult articles to negotiate (Inclusion International, 2014). As seen later, 
that reference would have made it easier to maintain the status quo and the fact that these 
organisations had to resist its inclusion is a reflection of how challenging it is to achieve the 
acceptance of universal recognition of all persons before the law.  
Despite the fact that the text for Article 12 was eventually agreed upon and adopted as part 
of the CRPD, the controversies surrounding this article have persisted with the way it is 
interpreted (Devi, Bickenbach, & Stucki, 2011; European Foundation Centre, 2010). The 
biggest debates focus on whether or not Article 12 can be interpreted as allowing substitute 
decision-making legislation to remain in place (Devi, 2013), and whether it is at all realistic 
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to remove such legislation.2  
On the Declarations and Reservations webpage of the United Nations Treaty Collection 
(2017),3 only Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and Norway mention supported-decision 
making in the declarations they made upon ratifying the CRPD. Significantly, all four 
countries specifically interpret Article 12 as allowing also for substitute decision-making, 
even if as a last resort. To take one example, Norway’s declaration reads as follows:  
Norway recognises that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with 
others in all aspects of life. Norway also recognizes its obligations to take appropriate 
measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in 
exercising their legal capacity. Furthermore, Norway declares its understanding that the 
Convention allows for the withdrawal of legal capacity or support in exercising legal 
capacity, and/or compulsory guardianship, in cases where such measures are necessary, as 
a last resort and subject to safeguards.  
Another six countries (Estonia, France, Georgia, Poland, Singapore and Venezuela) 
specifically interpret Article 12 as allowing existing substitute-decision making legislation to 
remain in place. Estonia’s declaration is reflective of the others:  
The Republic of Estonia interprets article 12 of the Convention as it does not 
forbid to restrict a person’s active legal capacity, when such need arises from the 
person’s ability to understand and direct his or her actions. In restricting the 
rights of the persons with restricted active legal capacity the Republic of Estonia 
acts according to its domestic laws.  
Iran, Brunei Darussalam and Kuwai maintain precedence of their respective national laws 
where there is incompatibility with the CRPD, with Kuwait singling out Article 12 as one of 
the articles where precedence of the country’s own legislation applies. Several countries 
objected to these declarations, including Mexico, which pointed out the fact that the Vienna 
Treaty prohibits such stances. On its part, in 2011, the United Kingdom withdrew the 
reservation it had made regarding putting in place a system for reviewing ‘all measures that 
relate to the exercise of legal capacity’ (Article 12.4). Egypt, in its declaration, distinguishes 
between having the capacity to acquire rights and having the capacity to act, with the 
former but not the latter being considered universal. The same position is adopted by Iraq 
and by (pre civil war) Syria (Iraq, 2006).  
In March 2017, out of the 172 United Nations Member States which had ratified the CRPD, 
only the 17 countries mentioned above had made a direct reference to Article 12, and none 
of them committed themselves to fully replacing substitute with supported-decision making 
legislation. Of the remaining 155 ratifying Member States, some deal with the issue of 
supported decision-making in Article 12 in their State reports (Committee 2017). For 
example, Argentina acknowledges that its substitute decision-making legislation does not 
meet the required standards, while Austria refers to criticism made by civil society 
 
2 See some of the submissions to the Draft General Comment on Article 12 available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/DGCArticles12And9.aspx. These submissions are also 
discussed later in this paper. 
3 The citations and quotations in the rest of this section are taken from this website. 
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organisations about this type of legislation, and Mexico describes Article 12 as posing 
‘challenges which remain to be tackled in the future.’ In its state report, Nepal refers to a 
draft bill that recognizes the legal capacity of all disabled persons and that invalidates 
legislation that denies this capacity. In the case of Bulgaria and Latvia, since submitting their 
reports, they have implemented small-scale projects that promote supported decision-
making (Empower people with intellectual dis- abilities, 2017; Zelda, 2017). Inclusion 
International (2014) also refers to several countries, including the Czech Republic, Colombia, 
Mexico and Ecuador that are developing supported decision-making. But most countries 
that have ratified the CRPD seem to be politely ignoring the requirement of repeal- ing 
substitute decision-making and replacing it with supported decision-making as stipulated 
clearly by the Committee in its General Comment.  
It is no wonder then that the Committee notes that ‘there has been a general failure to 
understand that the human rights-based model of disability implies a shift from the 
substitute decision-making paradigm to one that is based on supported decision-making’ 
(Comment para. 3).  
7. The paradigm shift  
The need to move from the paradigm of substitute to that of supported decision-making, 
which is noted by the Committee, is also described in the General Comment as a move from 
the ‘best interests’ to the ‘will and preferences’ paradigm ‘to ensure that persons with 
disabilities enjoy the right to legal capacity on an equal basis with others’ (Comment para. 
21).  
Several authors speak of the paradigm shift required by the CRPD in general and by Article 
12 in particular (Bach & Kerzner, 2010; Bartlett, 2012; European Foundation Centre, 2010; 
Quinn, 2010, 2011). The human rights lawyer Gerald Quinn (2011) calls Article 12 ‘the 
lightening (sic) rod for the paradigm shift’ (p. 5) but, as he quips, there have been so many 
people ‘sprouting platitudes about the “paradigm shift”’ that on hearing it mentioned once 
again one ‘might be inclined toward random acts of violence!’ (p. 4).  
In his paper, Quinn refers to violence of the ideological sort. When contrasting the views of 
advo- cates of supported and substitute decision-making he speaks of ‘a war of ideas, a 
clash of creeds’ (p. 4) and of revolutions and counter-revolutions. His call to arms involves a 
rethinking of our concept of personhood – one that does not de facto exclude those who 
have an intellectual disability, among others. It also involves repositioning the debate about 
Article 12 within the larger debate about citizenship rights, arguing that ‘[i]f it continues to 
be a disability-specific debate it will be dragged down by decades if not centuries of 
baggage’ (Quinn, 2011, p. 21).  
Quinn’s argument is a very valid one and his suggested approach one that should certainly 
be taken up. However, it needs to be complemented by an understanding of the effect 
which this centuries-long baggage has had on the way support for people with intellectual 
disability is seen not as a means of empowerment and of promoting autonomy and self-
determination but as a sign of deficit and lack of ability.  
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8. Of rules and their exceptions  
A further effect of that baggage is that it is substitute decision-making and denial of legal 
capacity rights that are mostly the rule and so an insistence on having only supported 
decision-making leg- islation and practices in place is a challenge to the status quo, to the 
way things are, to what is seen as the natural and obvious way of dealing with difficulties in 
the exercise of one’s legal capacity. It is therefore not just a question of substitute decision-
making still having the upper hand over supported decision-making. It is that the beliefs and 
ideas about the nature of intellectual disability on which the former is based are so deeply 
ingrained that whatever proponents of the supported decision- making paradigm say is 
always going to be interpreted within the ingrained logic of the substitute decision-making 
paradigm.  
It is as if society functions on two levels: a more or less laissez faire society for most people, 
including those with physical or sensory impairments, who have the capacity to exercise 
free will and shape their own destiny (Quinn, 2011); and a hierarchical and strictly 
determined society for people with intellectual disability, among others, whose lives and life 
decisions are determined by others because of difficulties to do so by themselves. The 
existence of these two levels is not, in the eyes of many, seen as a contradiction. 
Restrictions to legal capacity are assumed to be a necessary, even natural, response when 
the disabled person is seen as being in need of protection because of an inability of the 
person to manage their own affairs without support. Thus, Poland’s interpretative 
declaration refers to the application of incapacitation ‘when a person suffering from a 
mental illness, mental disability or other mental disorder is unable to control his or her 
conduct’ (United Nations Treaty Collection, 2017).  
As noted earlier, it is Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and Norway that so far have 
implemented or come close to implementing supported decision-making but even they 
speak of exceptions and last resorts. The problem with exceptions is that they leave the 
door open to the rule (in this case the rule of implementing support decision-making) not 
being followed. There is a danger that the amount of situations that are deemed as 
exceptions is so high that using substitute decision-making remains unexceptional, and that 
it is the supposed rule of supported decision-making that remains the exception. The key 
point here is that the situation remains so, that substitute decision-making simply retains 
the status quo as it has been for decades, even centuries. What is presented in these 
declarations as being treated as exceptional is what is currently unexceptional, because it is 
legally recognized supported decision-making practices that are still very much the 
exception. Substitute decision-making mechanisms are the default mode in most countries.  
Consequently, advocates of incapacitation, interdiction, guardianship, and other forms of 
substitute decision-making need only maintain things as they are. These practices are 
predicated on paternalistic structures that still largely dominate the lives of people of 
intellectual disability and attitudes that are based on a deficit-model of intellectual 
disability. The dispositions that arise from these practices and attitudes are then transposed 
into the interpretations of Article 12 and into the ways in which it is implemented.  
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9. Taking stock of the way things are  
Similarly to substitute decision-making, supported decision-making mechanisms are based 
on the acknowledgement that some disabled persons, including people with intellectual 
disability, need sup- port in making choices and taking decisions. This need is in fact also 
acknowledged in subarticles 3 and 4 of Article 12. Where the two mechanisms part 
company is the conclusion that they arrive at after making this acknowledgement. Unlike 
substitute decision-making, supported decision-making does not equate the need for 
support in making decisions with an inability to take those decisions. More importantly, it 
does not see this need as a reason for taking away a person’s legal capacity, nor does it 
consider it contradictory for a person to require support in taking decisions and yet retain 
their autonomy. Needless to say, this is not a position that is endorsed by all and sundry. It 
is therefore important to take stock of the way things are at different levels. Four levels are 
being considered here: the supranational, the national, the organisational and the 
individual.  
At a supranational level, everything can be said to be in place. Article 12 grants recognition 
as persons before the law to all disabled people, regardless of their impairment. The 
Committee’s General Comment reinforces the interpretation of this Article as granting legal 
capacity to all, thus requiring supported decision-making to be put in place and repealing all 
substitute decision-making legislation. The Committee’s position on this issue is further 
reinforced by the fact that complaints submitted to it under the Optional Protocol by 
disabled persons whose right to legal capacity has been removed from them under 
substitute decision-making legislation in their own country are still considered since the 
Committee does not recognise the removal of that right.4  
As seen above, at a national level, we find just a handful of countries with legislation that 
recognizes supported decision-making or which have declared their commitment towards 
such legislation. The Representation Agreement Act in British Columbia in Canada is a model 
of such legislation. However, the jurisdictions, which have adopted, or are considering 
adopting, supported decision-making legislation remain relatively few. And the possibility of 
imposing substitute decision-makers in ‘exceptional’ circumstances is retained. Examples of 
such circumstances are set out in some of the submissions made in response to the Draft 
General Comment (Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2014b). 
Submissions made by the French, German and Danish governments refer to people who are 
in a coma or a permanent vegetative state, and who have locked-in syndrome, advanced 
senile dementia, or profound intellectual disability.5 For the majority of jurisdictions, 
substitute decision-making legislation remains in place. And, as Clough (2015) argues, this 
type of legislation is embedded within a medical model view of intellectual disability.  
Then, at an organizational level, we find initiatives that promote supported decision-making 
by developing and promoting practices that enhance the decision-making skills of people 
with intellectual disability, such as the above-mentioned projects in Eastern Europe and 
 
4 See for example the case of the six persons with intellectual disability from Hungary who protested the 
removal of their right to vote on the grounds of lack of legal capacity. (Available from 
http://juris.ohchr.org/Search/Details/1988).  
5 Interestingly, Bach (2017) deals with supported decision-making precisely for persons with profound 
intellectual disability. 
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Latin America, as well as schemes that provide support in decision-making in some 
countries, including Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia 
(Boundy & Fleischner, 2013; Fundamental Rights Agency, 2013). The schemes referred to 
include practices that directly or indirectly implement the principles of supported decision-
making such as circles of support (Etmanski, 2004; Gross, Wallace, Blue-Banning, Summers, 
& Turnbull, 2012); and person-centred planning (O’Brien & O’Brien, 2004; Ratti et al., 2016). 
These practices emanate from positions that challenge the assumption of immanent deficits 
which must be compensated for by practices that exert control over the lives of people with 
intellectual disability and focus instead on structural barriers that prevent them from 
exercising such control, and are therefore embedded in the social model of disability 
(Clough, 2015).  
It is interesting to note that, of the 69 organisations that submitted responses to the Draft 
General Comment, 67 support the retention of legal capacity by all disabled persons and the 
introduction of legally recognized supported decision-making mechanisms and practices. 
The focus of these sub- missions is on how such mechanisms should operate and the issues 
that need to be dealt with. Only two organisations (FUTUPEMA in Spain and the Cambridge 
Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities Research Group) advocate for the retention of 
substitute decision-making for people with intellectual disability (Committee on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, 2014b).  
The existence of positions and practices that favour and promote supported decision-
making, encouraging as they are, do not tell the whole story. In fact, a focus on these 
initiatives and the fact that submissions to the Draft Comment were overwhelmingly in 
favour of supported decision-making can provide a misleadingly positive picture since, at an 
individual level, there is still very little legal recognition of supported decision-making 
processes. There may be increasingly more opportunities for people with intellectual 
disability to make their voices heard and to exercise choice and control in their lives. But 
these opportunities remain dispersed and limited. Ratti et al. (2016), for example, comment 
on the limited effectiveness for person-centred planning to bring about change in the lives 
of people with intellectual disability, while Power (2013) highlights the complexities of 
working with circles of support. Werner (2012) highlights, among other factors, the need for 
people with intellectual disability to develop the skills related to taking decisions for 
themselves. These and other difficulties do not augur well for the enactment of supported 
decision-making legislation and its enactment in related practices.  
For the majority of jurisdictions, substitute decision-  
 
However, the difficulties encountered in making such practices a reality in the daily lives of 
people with intellectual disability can be overcome by not only seeking to improve the 
practices themselves but, perhaps more importantly, by addressing external factors that 
inhibit their success and more widespread use. For example, in their submission to the Draft 
Comment, Advocacy for Inclusion note that the lack of recognition of legal capacity is not 
only imposed formally through substitute decision- making legislation but also informally 
through negative sociocultural constructions of the abilities of disabled persons. Through 
these constructions, withholding legal capacity is seen as an inevitable outcome of providing 
safeguards and protection, and the need for support is placed at odds with the retention of 
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legal capacity. Other obstacles arise from a concept of personhood that is directly linked to 
cognitive functioning which automatically denies the moral (and therefore also legal) status 
of being a person to those whose difficulties lie precisely in cognitive processes (Flynn & 
Arstein-Kerslake, 2014). Even worse, such purported protection stems from ‘a failure to 
recognize their humanity and personhood’ (Inclusion International, 2014, p. 19).  
Thus, positions and practices that focus on the abilities of persons with intellectual disability 
and are in favour of supported decision-making are still subordinated to positions and 
practices which are deficit-based, and which take the need for substitute decision-making 
legislation and practices as a given and actually equates it with the safeguarding of rights. 
This situation can only be reversed when recognition of legal capacity is enshrined in 
domestic laws, and therefore at the national level. As seen above, unfortunately this is the 
level where there seems to be the most resistance to removing sub- stitute decision-
making. As Arstein-Kerslake and Flynn (2016) state, ‘bring[ing] domestic legislative 
frameworks into conformity with Article 12 CRPD will inevitably be long and complex’ (p. 
484).  
10. The case for supported decision-making  
Arguments for and against supported and substitute decision-making are often bolstered by 
references to particular individuals whose situation illustrates either the necessity of 
retaining the safeguards afforded by substitute decision-making or the necessity of 
removing it not only to ensure the equal recognition of all disabled persons before the law 
but also to safeguard against abuses that can be perpetrated by those in whom the law 
invests the power to decide on behalf of a disabled per- son. It is easy to dismiss these 
arguments as being built on anecdotal evidence of individual situations. After all, exceptions 
have never made rules. On the other hand, one can argue that it is precisely the individual 
differences of each situation that needs to be focused on. These differences are inevitable 
simply because of the multiplicity of factors that impinge on each disabled individual’s life: 
the nature, type and severity of the impairment; the life history of the individual; the 
amount of support that each person finds in their life; their family background; the social 
class and ethnic group they belong to; and the history, culture and current situation of the 
country they live in among other factors.  
Substitute decision-making practices do not, and probably cannot, take these differences 
into account. These practices stem from generic assumptions underlined by the deficit-
model of disability and are then applied to individual situations. Supported decision-making, 
on the other hand, starts with the individual and works with them. Supported decision-
making allows for the recognition of the individual differences present in the situations of 
these persons and for the recognition of the different factors that can help or hinder the 
ability of a person to exercise their legal capacity. Furthermore, it allows for the recognition 
that each individual’s circumstances are exceptional, simply because no two people are 
alike and no two situations the same. There can therefore be no generalities, only 
exceptions.  
Each person’s situation should be treated as exceptional given that, on a day-to-day basis, 
persons with intellectual disability find themselves in situations where their legal capacity is 
recognized and others where it is not. Significantly, the same person can easily experience 
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both types of situation and receive contradictory messages about their own capacity to 
make choices, express views and take decisions at different levels and in different contexts. 
Furthermore, a person with intellectual disability can be in a situation where they are not 
formally placed within the guardianship system but effectively have their life controlled by 
someone else (Fundamental Rights Agency, 2013). Conversely, a person with intellectual 
disability may have been formally assigned a guardian who then proceeds to involve the 
person in decisions and fully respect their will and preferences. These contradictory 
situations arise from the different responses to the different abilities and support needs 
experienced by different people with intellectual disability. And those responses are 
contingent on the disposition of the people who are closely involved in the disabled 
person’s life. Supported decision-making legislation allows for the recognition of these 
complexities and for the ability to respond to them accordingly. Most importantly, it allows 
for the legal recognition of decisions taken by the person with intellectual disability in 
different situations by different means.  
Perhaps the single most forceful argument against substitute decision-making is that, once 
it is imposed on a person, there is no direct recourse for that person under national laws. If 
they want to appeal the decision, or if they want to take legal action because of abuse 
perpetrated by their supposed protectors, they cannot take the case themselves to their 
own country’s courts of law, because it is those very courts that have taken away their 
right to exercise their legal capacity and represent themselves.6 Having your legal 
capacity taken away from you and a substitute decision-maker assigned to act on your 
behalf is one way of crossing the Rubicon – there is no going back from it. On the other 
hand, supported decision-making, whatever its complexities and imperfections, is a 
paradigm that allows for adjustments and changes to be made which, crucially, can be 
directed by the person with intellectual disability themselves.  
11. Conclusion: taking exception to the way things are  
That supported decision-making practices already exist is clear from, among others, some of 
the literature cited in this article. But, except in a handful of jurisdictions where supported 
decision- making is legally recognised, such practices remain private arrangements that are 
put in place by persons with intellectual disability and those who support them in their daily 
lives. Bach (2017) points out the value of these practices and the importance of continuing 
to develop them as a means of challenging the legal status quo where the official 
recognition of their validity remains the exception rather than the rule. The ad hoc nature 
and complexity of supported decision-making arrangements should be considered a 
strength, because these ensure that arrangements made truly suit the support needs of 
each individual with intellectual disability. Perhaps it is when such practices stop being an 
exception and become the rule in the everyday lives of people with intellectual disability, 
when they simply become the way things are done, that the rights enshrined in Article 12 of 
 
6 The cause célèbre in this regard is that of Rusi Stanev, the Bulgarian man with mental health issues who, 
despite hav ing his right to recognition as a person before the law upheld by the European Court of Human 
Rights, could not demand the court in his country to respect the ECHR’s ruling precisely because he was not 
recognised as a person before his own country’s court. National law therefore trumped a ruling taken by a 
supranational legal body. Perhaps the most tragic aspect of Stanev’s story is that he died in 2017 without ever 
having his guardianship revoked. For more about his case see http://www.mdac.info/en/news/tribute-rusi-
stanev. 
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the CRPD will truly become a reality for people with intellectual disability.  
Bartlett (2012) states that moving from substitute to supported decision making legislation 
would be an ‘extraordinary change... the effects on domestic law would be profound’ (p. 
753). A pro- found effect would also be felt by people with intellectual disability, not only 
because their right to retaining their legal capacity and their right to equal recognition as 
persons before the law would be upheld, but also because they would gain legal recognition 
of the methods that they already use to make choices and take decisions. It would mean 
having legal status conferred on informal supported decision-making arrangements which 
many persons with intellectual disability and the people who support them in their everyday 
lives have evolved to suit the needs of each person. And it would also mean that for people 
with intellectual disability to exercise their legal capacity, they can be supported by adults 
who take that capacity as a given rather than something that is questioned and needs to be 
assessed. What matters in the end is that what happens on an individual and daily basis in 
the life of each and every person with intellectual disability is considered to be valid in the 
eyes of the law. It is in this way that we can move away not only from using terms like Idiots 
but also from all the deficit-based misconceptions inherent in the term and its many 
synonyms.  
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